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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
RAYMOND STROHM, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11166 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Raymond Strohm, appeals from conviction 
of the crimes of burglary in the third degree and grand 
larccncy in the Third .Judicial District Court, Salt Lake Coun-
ty, State of Ut;ih, the Honorable Merrill C. Faux presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The jury found defendant guilty of burglary in the third 
degree and grand larceny. He was sentenced in the Utah State 
Prison for the indeterminate term as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the Third 
District Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was convicted of burglary in the third de-
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gr;:e and grand larceny after trial by JUry. The v1ct1m ot th, 
offense was Delivery Service and Transfer Company of Salt 
Lake City, Utah (T. 3). 
During the trial, Nick Palukos, investigating officer witf 
the Salt Lake City Police Department, testified that he inter-
viewed the defend:mt on July 13 or 14 in the interrogation 
room at the Salt L;lke County Jail ( T. 21) , where def en darn 
was being held on another charge (T. 20). Defendant was 
given a Miranda warning (T. 19), and defendant specifically 
stated that he understood his rights and what the officer had 
told him before entering into conversation (T. 21). Before 
Officer Palukos was allowed to testify about the conversation 
he had had with defendant, defense counsel requested and 
was given permission to voir dire the witness. Testimony on 
voir dire revealed that ( 1) the conversation took place on 
July 13 or 14 in the city jail where defendant was being held 
on another charge, ( 2) the defendant had indicated that he 
understood his rights and had stated that he understood what 
the officer told him before going into conversation (T. 21), 
(3) that during the interrogation he did not request counsel 
and ( 4) that at the time of the interrogation defendant was 
ill. The officer gave an opinion that defendant was suffering 
from narcotics withdrawal but that he appeared to be able 
to concentrate fully on what was proceeding (T. 22). 
After concluding voir dire examination, defense counsel 
objected to any further testimony concerning the conversation 
on the ground that defendant was undergoing narcotics with-
drawal and that questioning under such circumstances would 
amount to implied volition and implied coercion (T-22). 
Counsel for the State replied to the objection stating that he 
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1 hough t the reason for the Miranda warning was to guard 
,1gainst the defendant being forced into or tricked into a con-
fession but that if through his own physical condition which 
he li!rnsclf created and not through intin1idation or from some 
external force, he places himself in a position where he con-
the rules of £airplay are not violated and such an ob-
jection coulJ noc be used to keep an admission out of evidence 
(T. 22). 
After hearing d.irect testimony, voir dire testimony and 
the arguments cf counsel ccncerning the nature of the confes-
sion, the court ruled that the defendant had been warned un-
der the Miranda decision and was given the opportunity to ask 
for counsel (T. 23). The court then allowed the state to pre-
~ent further testimony pcrtair,ing to the conversation between 
Jcfembnt and Officer Palukos. The officer testified that dur-
ing the ten minute interrogation, defendant "mentioned that 
he, along with two o:her individuals, had gone to this building, 
that he had stayed in the car while the other two individuals 
entered the building; and they returned with the property, 
placed it in the car, and they left the scene" (T. 23). Officer 
Palukos further testified that defendant stated he sold the prop-
erty to an undercover agent for the sheriff's department 
(T. 33). 
On cross-examination, the officer stated that defendant, 
during the interrogation, was clear-thinking but was shaking 
and tlut when asked how he felt, defendant replied that he 
was okay, that he was all right (T. 24). The interrogation was 
discontinued after ten minutes of questioning. The officer 
stated to the defendant that he would return when defend;int 
felt hetter. 
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4 
During the trial, Officer John Harvey Van Katwyk, 
deputy for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, testified tha· 
he was engaged ~n undercover work involving defendan· 
(T. 26), that he purch:ised the typewriter introduced inti 
evidence as the stolen typewriter from defendant :it the sam1 
time that he purchas<>d a stamp machine (T. 29). 
During the trial, Lieutenant Paul LaBounty of the Salr 
Lake County Sheriff's Office testified that at the time the de· 
fondant was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail, defend,1m 
stated, "Lieutenant (meaning Officer LaBounty), you better 
check into your boys buying hot typewriters." (T. 36). Fur 
ther testimony indicated the hot typewriter alluded to WJ• 
the one purchased bv Officer Van Katwyk. (T. 3 6). 
During the trial, the appellant-defendrnt took the stand ir1 
his own beh;ilf and recalled having a conversation with Officer 
Palukos in jail but could not recall any specific conversation• 
regarding the burglary. He indicated that he had been on nar· 
cotics for a period of two weeks prior to the time of arrest 
was sick, and could not remember exactly what happened. Ht 
further testified that Officer Palukos had the admission 01 
the confession as to rhe burglary mixed up with other incident· 
under investigation (T-47). Defendant testified that the stoler 
items in question had been brought to him by Mike Martinel 
and Ernie G:illego~. who had asked him to sell the tvpewriter 
(T. 49). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT l 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED ON nn 
ADMISSIBILITY AND VOLUNT ARTNESS OF THE AP 
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PELLANT'~ ADMISSION OR CONFESSION BEFORE AL-
LOWING THE SAME TO BE HEARD BY THE JURY. 
Appellant's appeal is based on the allegation that the trial 
wurt committed prcjvdicial error in ruling that the question 
uf the voluntariness of the confession or admission is one for 
the jury. The appeil:rnt further alleges that the trial court 
violated defendant's right to due process and procedure of rules 
set <lown by this court. 
A review of the record will show that the confession or 
:1dmission of defendant was heard by the jury only after the 
judge had ruled as to its admissibility. Rather than have a sep-
arate hearing as to :idmissibility of the confession or admission 
out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel chose to voir 
dire Officer Palukos and object to introduction of any conver-
>ation the officer had with defendant. The voir dire examina-
tion included tcstimcny as to the time of the conversation, the 
place of the conversation, the preliminary Miranda warning 
and statements to the defendant. Defense counsel made objec-
tion to the introduction of further conversation and both sides 
were given the opportunity to argue the law involved before 
the judge made his ruling. Counsel for the St:<te's last sentence 
before the court ruled was "I don't think this could be used 
to keep this kind of statement out." (T. 23). "This" referred 
to the argument by defense counsel that narcotics withdrawal 
made defendant's statements involuntary and coercive. The 
court's folI reply was "\'V ell, the court will rule that, as to 
the warning under the Miranda decision, it appears he was 
warned, giv~n an opportunity to ask for counsel. As to whether 
o:· Dot what he said was voluntary is a question for the jury. 
lJ nder rhe circumstances that this has developed here, whether 
voluntary or coerced, would be a matter for the jury to deter-
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mine." er. 2)). The 'circumstances" the judge alludes LO Jft 
the events of the record which reveal that defendant was al 
lowed to voir dire the State's witness, put evidence before th, 
court as to the nature of the conversation and argue the legJ' 
aspects of the matter before a trial judge. It Wc1S after thesr 
"circumstances" that the judge ruled and allowed the State tu 
proceed with the conversation between the officer and the de-
fendant. It is obvious that the Judge ruled on the very question 
of involuntariness and coercion in that he admitted the con-
versation into evidence for the consideration of the jury onlr 
after the defendant had had the opportunity to object to it1 
entry into evidence. Prior to the time of this ruling, the sub-
stance of a confession or admission was not before the jury. The 
only testimony the jury had heard prior to the ruLng wa1 
whether or not the narcotics withdraw::il was sufficient to keep 
the officer from testifying about the conversation with de-
fendmt. 
After making the ruling prior to having the confession OJ 
admission heard by the jury, the judge then properly stated thar 
the question of volu'1tarine's ;:md co-~rcion was one that the jury 
must determine. 
State i·. Crank, 105 Unh 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943) se[1 
forth procedures and guidelines to be followed by the trd 
court in determinir-ig the voluntariness of a confession or ~d­
mission of 8 criminal defend:rnt before submirting the question 
to a jury. The court stated: 
"\Vhen the state seeks to put the confession be-
fore the jury, it mmt establish its competency to the 
court. To do this it must be shown that the confession 
was given by the accused as his voluntary act; as an 
expression d his independent and free will, uninflu-
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L·nu:d by tear or punishment or by hope o± reward; 
that it was not induced or influenced by any ad-
vanta gcs or benefits that might accrue to him or those 
near or dear to him, nor was it given to lighten any 
penalties or punishments that the law might impose 
upon him if tried and convicted without confessing; 
th;ct it was n::•t given as a desire to escape or avoid 
,my mioery., thre::tts, or conduct of any other person, 
having it in the;r power, or whom he believed had it 
in their pnwer, to inflict upon him, or upon whom 
it was his duty or privilege to protect. This is a basic 
;:ind comtitutionally gu;:iranteed right of the accused." 
It is cl<::8r in the record that this b:isic and constitutional-
ly guaranteed right of the accused was sJfeguarded and that 
the court he;::rd evidence on the points listed above. 
The appelbnt would have the court belie'.re that the actual 
procedure followed in St,1tc Z'. Crank must be followe~ i11 al! 
cases. The irnporr;mce in Side 1/, Crank is that it sets up the 
basic and constitutiof'a Hv guaranteed rights of the 1ccused, 
along with gv.:,_{~!inr:s for 5:ifeg•1arding those rights. In State v. 
[rmdcn, 1 5 Urah 2d 64, 3 87 P.2d 240 ( 1963), th;, court clis-
cussed the question of what p;-ocedure was to be followed in 
dct2rmining volunnrines:; of a confession. The court statrd: 
"There is no statutory mandate as to the pro-
cedure to be followed. Nor should there be any rigid 
::tnd inviolable one. The duty which evolves in the 
trial court is to adopt and follow some procedure 
which will guard against admission of spurious con-
fessions or ::tdmissions. This h::td been varied somewhat 
depending on the circumstmces of each case and the 
court should li::ive considerable latitude of discretion 
as how to protect the rights of the defendants in that 
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regard. lf that purpose is served, the tact that the 
course adopted may vary from some other procedure 
which may have also been deemed permissible, should 
not result in the reversal of the conviction." 
Further elaborating- the court states: 
"It must be borne in mind, the court has not only 
the duty mentioned to the defendant, must also safe-
guard the rights of the state. Furthermore, it has the 
responsibility of seeing that the trial moves forward in 
an orderly manner and with such reasonable expedi-
tion as can be achieved consistent with looking after 
the interests of both sides of the controversy. It would 
be quite impractical to halt the main trial, excuse the 
jury, and conduct a collateral trial on the question 
of voluntariness of an admission or a confession every 
time a defendant's counsel might make an objection. 
While this has indeed been approved as proper pro-
cedure under circumstances which require it, it should 
be done only when there is presented such genuine and 
substantial issue as to voluntariness that in the court's 
judgment there is some real possibility that permitting 
the jury to hear the evidence would so prejudice their 
minds that the defendant would not have a fair trial." 
State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 (1956) 
states: 
"Although the burden of proof as to the volun-
tariness of the confession lies with the party seeking to 
use it as evidence, i.e., the prosecution, after the trial 
court has decided from the evidence that the confes-
sion was voluntarily made, the appellate court will not 
disturb that finding in the absence of a showing of 
abuse of its discretion when there is no substantial 
evidence from which it could reasonably so find. It 
is clear from the record that the trial court did have 
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9 
evidence before it from which it could make a ruling 
that the confession was voluntarily made." 
It is submitted that the trial court committed no prejudi-
cial error, nor violated any constitutionally guaranteed right 
of the accused or abused its discretion. The judge was given 
sufficient evidence through direct examination, voir dire exam-
ination and ~rguments of counsel of which to base a ruling 
that the defendant received sufficient warning under the 
Miranda decision and had had an opportunity to ask for coun-
sel and that the fact that defendant was ill from narcotics 
withdrawal was not sufficient to keep the confession from the 
jury. After so ruling, the question then was one that was prop-
erlv for the jury to determine and to give weight to the ques-
tion of voluntariness or coercion. This procedure adopted by 
the trial court would meet the requirements of the orthodox 
rule followed in Utah that the trial judge is to hear the evi-
dence and rule for the purpose of admissibility of a confession 
and that the jury is to consider voluntariness as it affects 
weight or credibility of the confession as set forth in State v. 
Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 (1948); State v. Brosch, 
119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289 (1951); State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 
2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 (1956); State 11• Crank, 105 Utah 332, 
142 P.2d 178 ( 194)) ; Stair z:. Louden, 1 5 Utah 2d 64, 3 87 
P.2d 240 ( 1963). 
In the present case, we are not faced with the situation 
where the defendant has been tortured or subjected to long 
periods of questioning. On the contrary, the defendant made 
the confession or admission during a ten minute interrogation 
for a crime other than the one for which he had been charged 
and was in custody. His statements to the officer were that he 
knew what he was doing, that he understood his rights and that 
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IO 
he felt all right. These statements brought out in voir dire 
testimony indicate a voluntary confession and is the type oi 
evidence 'N bich the trial judge can take into consideration in 
determining the voluntariness for the purpose of admissibility 
of the confessicn. State l'. Londc11, supra, indicates that there 
are many procedures tlnt can be followed by the trial court 
in admittins an admission or confession into evidence. In the 
present case, it was defense counsel who chose to voir dire and 
·argue the p8int in the presence of the jury rather than ask 
for a separ::i.te hearing. Defendant was given an opportunity 
to present his side of the case during the trial. 
Appellant's brief contains a discussion on United Staw 
Supreme Court case of ]acksoll i'. Dcn110, 378 U.S. 368, 84 
Sup.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 ( 1964), which the United States 
Supreme Court set clown constitutional guidelines for the pro-
cedure relative to determining voluntariness of the confession. 
The court held that the New York procedure for determining 
voluntariness of a confession offered by the prosecution vio-
lated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It should be pointed out that the procedure used by the New 
York court, commonly called the "New York Rule" is dif-
ferent from i:he procedure used for many years by the Utah 
courts commonly called the "\\7igmore" rule or the "Orthodox" 
rule. It is submitted that the procedures long in use in this 
State are in conformity with Jachson v. Denno, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court did rule 
on the ;;.dmis~ibility of the confession or admission before giv-
ing it to the jury. It is also eYident from the record that the 
judge had mfficient evidence before him on which to make 
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l j 
]11S ruling. It is submitted that the porcedure used by the trial 
court to assemble the eYidence necessary on which to make a 
ruling was ~!ltirely within his discretion and within the guide-
lines as set out in St.1te r. Louden, and other cases cited. It 
should be stated th::it the petitioner has the burden of persuad-
ing the trial court by a preponderance of evidence acts which 
will entitle him to relief. When the trial judge has made find-
;ngs of fac! and a iudgment thereon, they are entitled to the 
presumption of correctness. On appeal, the evidence is sur-
\'eyed in the light favorable to them, and if there is any reason-
able basis in the evidence to support them, they will not be 
overturned. 
It is respectfully submitted that there has been no viola-
tion of defendant's rights and no prejudicial errors committed 
by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DON R. STRONG 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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